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Katherine Angela Luongo
Motive Rather than Means
Legal Genealogies
of Witch-Killing Cases in Kenya
Most of the recently published works on witchcraft in the legal arena in
Africa have dealt with focused on the state’s criminalization of witchcraft
beliefs, practices and accusations or with its related efforts to prove and
prosecute the inherently invisible crimes of witchcraft within the bounds of
a squarely evidentiary-based legal system1. Yet, despite its fruitful treat-
ment of the intersections of supernatural situations and state legal systems,
such scholarship elides another central space in which notions of “customs”
and “crimes” collide—murder cases in which witchcraft is posed not as the
means but instead as the motive for the murder at hand2.
In such cases, the alleged “witch” is not on trial for witchcraft or for
another crime committed through witchcraft, but is instead the decedent in
the murder being tried. The defendant, in turn, is on trial not for a murder
committed through witchcraft but rather for a murder motivated by the wit-
chcraft turned against him or her by the decedent. And, in cases in which
1. This article broadly takes the term “witchcraft” to denote the use of supernatural
power to harm the person, psyche or property of another, or to borrow Diane
Ciekawy’s helpful phrase, the perpetration of “magical harm”. Malevolent wit-
chcraft is often termed “black magic” in primary and secondary sources. Witch-
craft for “healing” or “white magic”—the use of supernatural power most often
to undo or mitigate the effects of “magical harm”—is distinct from malevolent
witchcraft in the understandings of contemporary informants although historical
sources often confuse and conflate the two (CIEKAWY 1998: 119-143). Harry
WEST (2005) also offers a subtle study of the state of supernatural power in
Mozambique, see also, interviews conducted by the author in Machakos District,
Kenya, in 2004. For example, R. K. Kilungu, September, 2004; B. W. Pipeline,
August 2004.
2. This article departs from Mahmood Mamdani’s contention that there existed a
“bipolar” colonial legal system in which “customary” law and “native” courts
were primarily responsible for governing Africans’ affairs. Mahmood MAMDANI
(1996). On witchcraft, see, for example, the excellent work of Peter GESCHIERE
(1995, 2002) and Adam ASHFORTH (2005).
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witchcraft is the motive rather than means of a murder, witchcraft operates
variously as a claims-making strategy of the defense and as a means for the
courts to consider further standards of “reasonableness” in local contexts.
Defense claims about the decedent’s witchcraft work variously to miti-
gate the culpability of the accused, generally pointing to competing institu-
tions of “local” justice or suggesting the defendant’s diminished capacity.
Court counter-claims about the decedent’s witchcraft offer a space for the
courts to assess both the legal fitness of various trial participants and the
authority of the law-as-written in the context of witchcraft-related murder
cases. Yet at the same time, defense claims and the courts’ counter-claims
about the witchcraft of the decedent each operate on a broader epistemologi-
cal level, calling into question not only essential categories like “victim”
and even “murder”, but also key legal concepts such as “provocation” and
“malice aforethought”.
This article traces the legal genealogies of witchcraft claims and counter-
claims within the legal arena of colonial Kenya. Attending briefly to the
broader politics of knowledge production in the empire, it addresses how
witchcraft emerged as a central colonial concern. This article also incorpor-
ates anti-witchcraft legislation and relevant sections of the Kenya Penal
Code with reports on witch-killing cases contained in the digests of the
Supreme Court of Kenya and of the High Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa
in order to foreground how witchcraft claims and counter-claims made in
East Africa’s highest courts contributed to the refinement of legal meanings
of witchcraft and to the elaboration of legal concepts central to the prosecu-
tion of capital crimes. Finally, it points to significant continuities in colo-
nial and post-colonial witch-killings and anti-witchcraft legislation in Kenya.
Colonial Records, Colonial Concerns
The broad array and regular appearance of witch-killing cases in the digests
of East Africa’s highest courts begs the question, “How did witchcraft enter
the colonial record and become an object of official concern”? (Amin
1995). Witchcraft emerged as a locus of official disquiet via the systemized
and professionalized production of anthro-administrative knowledge through-
out the colonial era3. A primary goal of the archived and archiving colonial
state was to render subject peoples more easily governable by making their
unfamiliar cultures, customs, and institutions known quantities. In turn, a
key component of an administrator’s role was to make “knowable” the for-
merly “unknown” people under his control; to collect, organize, report, and
3. Anthro-administrative knowledge refers to the anthropological data generated by
the fabled “men-on-the-spot” in the course of their duties and for the purpose
of developing colonial governmental “best practices”.
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circulate anthro-administrative data4. Administrators produced articles and
monographs based on anthro-administrative data and these texts generally
evidenced a deep interest with important aspects of local cosmologies—in
particular, witchcraft beliefs and practices5.
Anthro-administrative knowledge was circulated through topical, imperial
networks of varying scale throughout the colonial era through “circuits of
empire” (Cooper & Stoler 1989).
Such knowledge was passed from administrators on-the-ground to authori-
ties in other branches of the colonial government (like the courts) situated
in the capitol and on to Colonial Office officials in the metropole. Colonial
Office authorities archived anthro-administrative knowledge in a complex
classification system that enabled it to be accessed and (re)circulated by
officials throughout the empire. Further, anthro-administrative knowledge
also passed through tertiary circuits such as the academy, organs of civil
society, and the press.
The colonial bureaucratic reportage that flowed through imperial net-
works of knowledge was permeated with anthro-administrative discourse
about witchcraft, and such discourse figured portrayed witchcraft as a cen-
tral challenge to state authority from a variety of angles. In this discourse,
“witchcraft” primarily worked as a descriptor and as an analytic. It descri-
bed states of supernatural insecurity in the colonies and patterns of local
mentalities, and it analyzed how these factors impeded administration.
Indeed most colonial officials in Kenya (and in the metropole) would likely
have registered an annual report’s contention that “witchcraft” was “the
most serious handicap to Administration” in the Ukambani region of the
colony as neither hyperbolic nor unexpected6.
4. For example, circa 1930, the East Africa Commission asserted that “[. . .] anthro-
pology should be considered as a subject having the most important applications
in the sphere of administration in our tropical possessions, and should not be
regarded as a study of purely academic interest [. . .]” “Report of the East Africa
Commission”, Cmd. 2387. Cited in PRO CO 822/21/2. Anthropological
Research. Writing on the “demand-supply of anthropology” in the same period
Bronislaw Malinowski (then professor at the London School of Economics), put
“colonial administrators” first on the list of “those responsible for the develop-
ment of backward peoples in Africa”, and argued that their work “necessitates
the study of primitive cultures through scientific anthropology”. Archives of
the London School of Economics, Malinowski/Afr/13. Demand-Supply of
Anthro, 1931.
5. By 1910, C. W. HOBLEY, one of the most prolific anthro-administrators, had pub-
lished an anthropological monograph which focused strongly on Kamba cosmo-
logy and which was derived in part from his administrative writings. The 1909-
1910 Machakos District Annual Report shows that HOBLEY’s text (1910) was
immediately put into use as a reference for other colonial officials. See also,
KNA DC/MKS.1/2. District Commissioner, Machakos. Machakos District
Annual Report, 1909-1910.
6. KNA DC/MKS/1/3/6. District Commissioner, Machakos. Kitui District Annual
Report, 1916. Indeed, this view was consistent through out the colonial era.
Thee minutes of an early 1950s Colonial Social Science Research Committee on
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In the legal arena more specifically, anthro-administrative knowledge
about witchcraft functioned in a number of key ways. First, it was the
initial avenue through which witchcraft entered the courts and became an
object of official juridical concern. Administrators on-the-ground were
responsible for bringing to the attention of the high courts the dead and
damaged bodies of “witches” which so often appeared in the bush and which
the state could not ignore. These bodies, and the circumstances surrounding
them, brought into high relief how the colonial monopoly on the exercise
of spectacular violence was something on an imperial fantasy.
In turn, anthro-administrative understandings about witchcraft—together
with related colonial concerns about witch-killings and the broader colonial
vulnerabilities they exposed—formed the backdrop to the development of
the anti-witchcraft ordinances7. Knowledge about witchcraft generated by
administrators on-the-ground contributed strongly to ways in which the
courts were able to consider witchcraft, both as a crime in and of itself,
and in relation to murder. And, such knowledge offered colonial justices
avenues of “culturally reasonable conjecture” in dealing with witchcraft and
helped to shape the broader knowledges brought to bear on the cases of
witch-killing like those detailed below (Stoler 1992: 153).
The Witchcraft Ordinances
The law then provided a primary avenue through which colonial regimes
throughout Africa sought simultaneously to discipline witchcraft and to deny
its efficacy and/or existence. In Kenya (as elsewhere throughout the conti-
nent), colonial administrations developed a series of anti-witchcraft ordinan-
ces which criminalized “black magic” and under some readings, “white
magic” as well. Yet, for all of their discursive wrangling, these ordinances
actually failed to offer any clear definitions of witchcraft per se.
In the majority of cases, the evidentiary demands and the official incred-
ulity enshrined in colonial anti-witchcraft ordinances rendered legal recourse
against the activities of alleged witches impractical if not wholly imposs-
ible. Rather than curbing witchcraft-related disorder, anti-witchcraft legis-
lation instead regularly functioned as an indirect stimulus to violence against
alleged witches when the purported victims of witchcraft who were unable
Law and Land Tenure meeting stipulate that in “view of the conflict of English
and customary legal conceptions”, that “a comparative study of witchcraft in
native customary law and in Colonial Statutory law” be listed as one of five
prospective projects of “primary importance”, PRO CO 901/40, Colonial Social
Science Council on Law and Land Tenure, 1949-1953, Papers and Minutes, Colo-
nial Social Science Research Council Committee on Law and Land Tenure, Min-
utes of the Second Meeting, 5 July (No year listed).
7. The development of the anti-witchcraft ordinances is discussed in detail in the
next section of this article.
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to find satisfaction in colonial courts took matters of “justice” into their
own hands by killing alleged witches through acts of individual or vigilante
violence. The following section traces the genealogy of the Witchcraft Ord-
inances in Kenya, highlighting how colonial legal languages aimed to
(re)formulate witchcraft according to colonial prerogatives.
In Kenya, the first anti-witchcraft legislation was debated, revised and
passed by the Legislative Council in 19098. The initial goal of the Witch-
craft Ordinance (1909) was “to make provision for the punishment of a
person practicing or making use of so called witchcraft”. In the second
reading of the bill, two members of the Legislative Council proposed with-
out success excising the words “supernatural power” from the second sec-
tion of the bill. In the same meeting, the Crown Advocate successfully
moved for the insertion of language protecting African functionaries from
prosecution under the ordinance. The new language read,
“No proceedings for an offence under this Ordinance shall be taken against a Chief,
Sub-Chief, Headman, or elder, on account of anything done by such Chief, Sub-
Chief, Headman or Elder in exercise of his authority as such, except with the previ-
ous sanction of the Governor”9.
The bill was passed on its third reading in the summer of 1909. As
Richard Waller (2003: 245) has succinctly summarized, “the 1909 legisla-
tion established [. . .] three criminal offences; to claim to be a witch or to
‘pretend to exercise or use any kind of supernatural power, witchcraft, sor-
cery or enchantment [. . .] for the purposes of gain’ (section 2); to advise
others on how to use witchcraft or to supply them with the ‘pretended means
of witchcraft’ (section 3); and to use such advice or means to ‘injure any
person or property’ (section 4)” (Waller 2003)10.
Punishment varied from terms of imprisonment of between one year and
ten years.
The evidentiary demands of the 1909 ordinance proved unwieldy and
the 1918 revision of the ordinance repealed section two which stipulated
that the offence of witchcraft entailed “gain” and substituted instead the
following language:
“Any person who hold himself out to be a witch doctor able to cause fear, annoy-
ance, or injury to another in mind, person, or property or who pretends to exercise
8. PRO CO 544/2. East Africa Protectorate Legislative Council Minutes. Meet-
ings held 1st March 1909, 18th May 1909, and 5th July 1909.
9. Ibid. This provision is in accord with the larger colonial project of establishing
the authority of colonial “functionaries”—African middle figures who were to
aid the British colonial officers who could not be everywhere in their districts
at once. As a 1909 Ulu Quarterly Report aptly explained, “The prestige of the
Chiefs is in the process of being created in most cases”. KNA DC/MKS.1/1/3.
District Commissioner, Machakos. Ulu Quarterly Report, 1909.
10. See also PRO CO/542/2. Official Gazettes of the East Africa Protectorate: Wit-
chcraft Ordinance of 1909, p. 329.
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any kind of supernatural power, witchcraft, sorcery or enchantment calculated to
cause such fear, annoyance or injury shall be guilty of an offence and shall be
liable to imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding one year [. . .].”
Further, the 1918 ordinance struck from section four of the original ordi-
nance the words “to injure any person or property” and substituted the lan-
guage “to cause fear, annoyance or injury in mind, person, or property to
any person”11. The new language thus shifted the heart of the witchcraft
offense from material gain to pretense to supernatural power and the produc-
tion of psychological and/or physical harm of through such pretense.
The core remained the same in the 1925 Ordinance, but fresh language
entailed provisions shaping the legality and illegality of witchcraft accusa-
tions and the roles of functionaries and British authorities in dealing with
them. First, the new language made accusing a person of “being a witch
or with [. . .] practicing witchcraft” a crime punishable by fine or imprison-
ment unless the accusation “was made to a district commissioner, a police
officer, an official headman or any other person in authority”. Further, the
new terms of the ordinance made a headman’s failure to report the “practice
or pretended practice of witchcraft by any person” to the district commis-
sioner a crime of omission, punishable by fine or imprisonment. Of course,
the ordinance also forbid headmen to in any way allow witchcraft or any
act that could be considered to counter the provisions of the Witchcraft
Ordinance. The ordinance’s new language also rendered employment or
solicitation of another “to name or indicate by the use of any non-natural
means any person as the perpetrator of any alleged crime or other act com-
plained” a crime punishable by fine or imprisonment12.
In sum, additions to the 1925 Ordinance carried two basic aims. First
was to expand the involvement of functionaries like chiefs and headmen in
combating witchcraft-related crimes by assigning them new roles like hear-
ing witchcraft accusations and reporting witchcraft activities in their loca-
tions while at the same time criminalizing a willful or indifferent neglect
to do so13. The additional language also placed more emphasis on the
11. PRO CO 544/12. Official Gazettes of the East Africa Protectorate: An Ordi-
nance to Amend the Law Relating to Witchcraft, 1918, p. 190.
12. PRO CO 542/19. Official Gazettes of the East Africa Protectorate, Special Issue:
An Ordinance to Consolidate and Amend the Law Relating to Witchcraft 1925,
p. 1131. The Witchcraft Ordinance of 1925 and the Witchcraft Ordinance (revi-
sed) of 1981, the law contra witchcraft currently on the books, are in language
and substance practically identical. See “The Witchcraft Ordinance (No. 23 of
1925)” and “the Witchcraft Act, (Chapter 67, 1981)”. See, Katherine LUONGO
(2005), Papers contained in KNA AG/1/610 show colonial authorities long-term
attempts to hammer out the semantics and practicalities of “witchcraft”. I am
grateful to Richard Waller for sharing his notes on this file with me as it is now
missing from the KNA collection. KNA AG/1/610, Attorney General, Witch-
craft, 1913-1943.
13. The development of the 1925 ordinance coincided with the enhancement of the
powers of Local Native Councils.
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criminality of witchcraft accusations, effectively rendering the activities of
diviners as crimes and again blurring the divide between witchcraft for harm
and witchcraft for healing.
Overall, none of the laws in the series of anti-witchcraft ordinances
offered a clear definition of witchcraft per se. And each subsequent law
was ineffective in diminishing witchcraft because as elements of an evidenti-
ary-based legal system, the ordinances required tangible evidence to prove
the perpetration of a “crime” which was inherently invisible. The inability
of the alleged victims of witchcraft to effectively seek recourse under the
Witchcraft Ordinances often precipitated the sorts of witch-killing cases ana-
lyzed below.
Witchcraft on the Books, Part I: Definitions and Refinements
The case reports of the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa and the High
Courts of Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda indicate that crimes related to
witchcraft were regularly tried by these bodies14. In the bulk of these cases,
defendants were alleged to have killed because they believed that the decea-
sed had in some way “bewitched” them or someone close to them. These
cases contributed to the refinement of the legal meanings of witchcraft and
to the elaboration of legal concepts central to the prosecution of capital
crimes15.
The first opinion on a witchcraft-related case to be recorded in the digests
of the East Africa Court of Appeal was Rex versus Karoga was Kithengi
and 53 Others (1913) in which the members of a Kikuyu “kiama”, a type of
pre-colonial governing body or council of elders co-opted into the colonial
administrative apparatus, appealed from a murder conviction for having bur-
ned to death two alleged witchdoctors with the sanction and participation
of their chief. During the High Court trial, solicitors for the kiama members
raised a three-pronged defense: (1) members of the kiama had not been
instructed as to the limits of their jurisdiction under the Native Tribunal
Rules, 1911, (2) they acted on the advice of their chief, and (3) in doing
so, they were justified in exercising their “ancient customary jurisdiction
to sentence witchdoctors to death”. Unsurprisingly, the courts rejected this
14. See the cases reported in, Law Reports for the High Court of Appeal for Eastern
Africa, Kenya Colony and Protectorate Law Reports, Uganda Protectorate Law
Reports, Tanganyika Territory Law Reports. A survey of over 100 murder cases
that were tried in the High Court of Kenya between 1938 and 1941 reveals that
17 were related to witchcraft. See KNA MLA 1/1-113.
15. Unfortunately, a 1939 fire in Nairobi’s Secretariat destroyed all case files from
the start of the colonial period into 1939. Thus, information about cases in this
era can only be ascertained from District and Provincial administrative reports
and correspondence and from court digests.
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defense on the grounds that under colonial law, the kiama no longer had
the authority to exercise customary forms of justice16.
The appeals court located the primary responsibility for the killings in
the chief’s neglect to instruct the councilors that they were no longer to
practice certain forms of “customary” justice and found the kiama members
guilty of the “abatement of culpable homicide”. In this case, witchcraft is
tangled up with the larger issue of the limits of the power imbued or
accorded by the colonial state to “traditional” authorities and how such
authorities should and could come to know the limits or expansions of their
powers17.
Four cases recorded in the digests aim to refine witchcraft as laid out
by the 1909 Witchcraft Ordinance and the 1925 Witchcraft Ordinance. Rex
versus Mtuiniwara (1914) overturned the conviction of a witchdoctor on
the grounds that in order for a conviction to stand, sections of the ordinance
stipulating “holds himself out as a witch doctor” and “for the purposes of
gain” had to be read and proved in tandem18. Working on a similar prin-
ciple, the 1915 decision in Rex versus Joke overturned a conviction under
the Witchcraft Ordinance on the grounds that while the appellant had
accepted payment for administering “medicine” he neither “held himself
out to be a witchdoctor” nor demanded payment. These two cases likely
contributed to the removal “gain” as a constituent element of the offence
of witchcraft in the 1918 revisions of the ordinance discussed above.
Next, the 1916 decision in Rex versus Matolo overturned a conviction
under the Witchcraft Ordinance on the grounds that though the appellant
did hang up a calabash of “witchcraft medicine” on his property, an “intent
to injure” could not be proved19. Finally, the decision in Shangati ole Sau-
roi (1929) held that the phrase “means and process” in Section 4 of the
1925 Witchcraft Ordinance could be taken to include spoken words, thereby
rendering witchcraft an act as much of speech as of substances20.
In addition to the “kiama” case, another case addressed the alleged wit-
chcraft of the deceased as a defense to murder. In Rex versus Kimonirr
and Five Others (1916), the principal appellant had accused the deceased,
Chesang, of killing her husband and son by sorcery. Chesang, as local
custom was alleged to dictate, hanged himself on the instructions of his
family. The decision of the court turned on local custom, as the Chief
Justice explained first that the death sentences could not be expunged
because “local practice” had not been followed to the letter, but that the
sentences could be reduced to “abatement of suicide” because findings pro-
ved that among the tribe in question, killing a witchdoctor was not “mor-
ally wrong”21.
16. 5 Law Reports of Kenya, 1913-1914. Hereafter, LRK.
17. 5 East Africa Law Reports, 1913-1914. Hereafter EALR.
18. 5 EALR, 1913-1914.
19. 6 EALR, 1915-1916.
20. 10 LRK, 1929-1930.
21. 6 LRK, 1915-1916.
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As evidenced in the reports summarized above, a range of topics sur-
rounded both cases of witchcraft and murder cases in which witchcraft was
raised as a defense. Up to the early 1930s, colonial High Court and East
Africa Court of Appeal opinions in witchcraft-related criminal cases, especially
murders, aimed to refine the fuzzy definitions of witchcraft laid out in anti-
witchcraft legislation and considered witchcraft in relation to the broader
issues of local practice or “custom”.
Rex versus Kumwaka (1932): A Pivotal Case and its Precedents
At the conclusion of the 1932 case, Rex versus Kumwaka s/o Mulumbi and
69 others, 60 Wakamba men were sentenced to death in the High Court of
Kenya for killing a neighbor woman whom they alleged to have been a
witch. The most high-profile witch-killing case of the colonial era, Rex
versus Kumwaka, refined and reinforced precedents in regard to key legal
concepts such as “malice aforethought” and “grave and sudden provoca-
tion”. More generally, the case redirected the focus of legal reckoning in
witch-killing cases from custom to commutation.
A summary section from the Law Reports of Kenya succinctly narrates
the events of Rex versus Kumwaka as assembled by the courts.
The first accused (Kumwaka) summoned the rest of the accused and
brought them to the vicinity of the hut in which was his wife, the woman
believed to have been bewitched. Next, the witch, the deceased, was seized
and brought to the sick woman’s hut and ordered to remove the spell. The
accused alleged that she had removed half the spell during the night. Early
in the morning, the witch was detected running away. All accused ran after
her and beat her with the thin sticks referred to above. As a result of the
beating the witch was killed22.
Similar to defense claims made in the “kiama” case, the defense in Rex
versus Kumwaka asserted that the men had done nothing wrong in killing
the alleged witch but, instead, had been carrying out king’ole, the Kamba
institution of justice directed against social malefactors like recidivist wit-
ches and thieves. The justices of the Supreme Court of Kenya were, how-
ever, unconvinced and handed down death sentences on the 70 accused.
Writing for the court, Chief Justice Jacob Barth explained that “the fact of
death in his judgment was sufficiently proved, and the issue to be decided
was whether or not the facts proved amounted to murder”23. The opinion
that “the facts of the case amounted to murder” rather than manslaughter
hinged on the principle of malice aforethought, “knowledge that the act or
omission will probably cause the death of or grievous harm to some per-
son”24. Applying the principle to Rex versus Kumwaka, Chief Justice Barth
22. Ibid.
23. “Sixty Natives to be Hanged”. The East African Standard, February 6, 1932.
24. 14 LRK, 1932.
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wrote: “It seems obvious to me that if 70 men and lads combine to beat a
woman although with thin sticks, they must have the knowledge that their
actions would probably cause death or at least grievous harm to the woman”25.
The Wakamba men appealed their case, but the High Court of Appeal
for Eastern Africa struck down the appeal. Issues of precedent, procedure,
and the law as written framed Chief Justice of Uganda Sir Charles Griffin’s
opinion on Rex versus Kumwaka. The opinion also addressed the appel-
lants’ contentions that beliefs in witchcraft constituted mitigating circum-
stances in capital crimes. “The principal grounds of appeal” proffered by
the defense were that Jacob Barth, Chief Justice of Kenya, ought to have
accepted the evidence of accused No. 1 that there was no mens rea, that
there was no evidence of combination or conspiracy to administer corporal
punishment, nor of concerted action as to the cause of death; and that homi-
cide was excusable, or alternatively, that it did not amount to murder, but
to manslaughter, having regard to Article 7 of the Kenya Colony Order-in-
Council, 1921.
The defense also argued that amongst the Kamba appellants, “There was
genuine and real belief in powers of the witch and fear as to the result of
her spell”. Countering the appellants’ claims, the three justices of the High
Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa concurred that “the evidence justified
the finding that the deceased died as a result of the beating” and that “the
Crown was not obliged to prove intention to kill”. Furthermore, the Justices
closed down the appellants’ last argument adding, “native belief in witch-
craft does not justify deviation from law by inflicting punishment on sus-
pected witch”26. Authoring the decision, Griffin elaborated on the points
addressed above. Griffin and the other justices supported Barth’s opinion
that the beating administered by Kumwaka and his group had led to the
alleged witch’s death and pointed out that the 70 Wakamba had never sug-
gested that they were innocent of beating her. Griffin explained, “On perus-
ing the evidence we entertain no doubt that she died, and died as a result
of the beatings administered. The accused themselves all admit the beating
and killing and none has sought to place blame on the rest or to excul-
pate himself”27.
Griffin then turned to the argument that “there was no intention to kill
the deceased”. He asserted that “it was no part of the case for the Crown
that there was any intention to kill”, nor was Chief Justice Barth’s verdict
“found[ed] on intention to kill”. He then cited the relevant sections of the
Kenya Penal Code on which Barth’s decision had been based. “Section
186 of the Penal Code” Griffin wrote, “defines murder as follows: ‘Any
person who of malice aforethought causes the death of another person by
25. Ibid.
26. 14 LRK, 1932. The appeal is also reprinted in some district administrators’
books. See KNA AG/52/349.
27. Ibid.
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an unlawful act or omission is guilty of murder’”. He added that the legal
concept of “malice aforethought” also informed Barth’s decision. The
Penal Code, Griffin explained, explains malice aforethought as follows:
“Malice aforethought shall be deemed to be established by evidence proving—(b)
knowledge that the act or omission causing death will probably be the cause of death
or grievous harm to some person [. . .] although such knowledge is accompanied by
indifference whether death or grievous bodily harm is caused or not, or by a wish
that it not be caused”28.
The members of the court, Griffin maintained, agreed entirely with Barth’s
decision that the appellants knew that beating Mwaiki would “probably
cause death or at least grievous harm”29.
Griffin and the other justices also closed down the section of the appeal
based on arguments of self-defense premised on the case Regina versus
Rose. In order to explain the Justices’ reasoning, Griffin first cited the head-
note of the case:
“Under circumstances which might have induced the belief that a man was cutting
the throat of this wife, their son shot and killed his father. On the trial of the son
for murder: — Held: that if the accused had reasonable grounds for believing and
honestly believed that his act was necessary for the defense of his mother, the
homicide was excusable.”
Griffin explained that “the important words are ‘that the act was necess-
ary’” and therefore he and the other Justices were “unable to appreciate the
relevance of Reg. v. Rose to the facts” of Rex versus Kumwaka, “where the
28. Ibid. Subsequent, relevant sections from the Kenya Penal Code 1930 concerning
manslaughter and provocation read as follows. Section 190. “Any person who
is shown to have caused the death of another is presumed to have willfully
murdered him unless the circumstances are such to raise a contrary presumption.
The burden of proving the circumstances is upon the person shown to have
caused the death of another”. Section 191. “When a person unlawfully kills
another under circumstances which, but for the provisions of the section would
constitute murder, does the act which causes the death in the heat of passion
caused by sudden provocation herein after defined, and before there is time for
passion to cool, he is guilty of manslaughter only”. Section 192. “The term
‘provocation’ means and includes, except as herein after stated, any wrongful
act or insult of a nature as to be likely, when done to an ordinary person, or in
the presence of an ordinary person who is under his immediate care, or to whom
he stands in conjugal, parental, filial or fraternal relation, or in the relation of
master or servant, to deprive him of the power of self-control and to induce him
to assault the person by whom the act or insult is done or offered. When such
an act is done or offered by one person to another, or in the presence of another
person who is under the immediate care of the other, or to whom the latter stands
in any such relation as the aforesaid, the former is said to give the latter provoca-
tion for an assault”. Penal Code of Kenya (1930): Division IV - Offences Against
the Person, Chapter XIX Murder and Manslaughter. Jomo Kenyatta University
Library (University of Nairobi) Afr. Docs. J 750.155.P4 1930, pp. 61-64.
29. 14 LR, 1932.
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killing was in no way necessary”. In the concluding the decision, Griffin
argued,
“It is also widely known, and as appears from the evidence in this case that Govern-
ment does not tolerate the killing of witches. The plea has been frequently put
forward in murder cases that the deceased had bewitched or threatened to bewitch
the accused, and that plea has been consistently rejected except in cases where the
accused has been put in such fear of immediate danger to his own life that the
defense of grave and sudden provocation has been held proved. For Courts to
adopt any other attitude to such cases, would be to encourage the belief that an
aggrieved party may take the law into his own hands, and no belief could well
have been more mischievous or fraught with greater danger to public peace and
tranquillity”30.
The High Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa’s dismissal of the appeal
in the case of Rex versus Kumwaka was thus constructed from a range of
angles. With reference to precedent and law as written, the Chief Justices’
opinion illustrated that beliefs in witchcraft did not legally constitute miti-
gating circumstances in the case of capital crimes. The opinion asserted
that evidence of “malice aforethought” in the killing of witches was suffi-
cient ground to consider their killings murder rather than manslaughter.
Also, according to the opinion, assaults on or killings of witches could not
be considered acts of self-defense. Finally, the opinion took a strong posi-
tion against vigilante justice. These positions became key reference points
in subsequent cases of witch-killing discussed below.
Witchcraft on the Books: When to Commute a Capital Sentence?
From the 1930s to the eve of the Mau Mau period, witch-murder cases
continued to be regularly tried in the colonial High Courts and the East
Africa Court of Appeal and were increasingly recorded in the digests of
these bodies31. Unlike the opinions on pre-Kumwaka cases discussed above
which did not reference each other, those opinions dating from the late
1930s onward were highly referential and concerned primarily with the
larger legal issue of “grave and sudden provocation”. This section briefly
summarizes the witchcraft-related murder cases heard in the East Africa
Court of Appeal and recorded in its available digests from the late 1930s
to the early 1950s32. It follows the development and refinement of the
30. Ibid.
31. The author searched through the case files/trial transcripts available in the Kenya
National Archives’ Ministry of Legal Affairs (MLA) series, but was unable to
locate files/transcripts for the cases contained in the court digests and presented
in this section of the article. The files/transcripts of many similar cases are
present in the MLA series, but were not present in court digests.
32. Unfortunately, none of the sets of digests held at the School for Oriental and
African Studies Library, the University of Nairobi Law Library, and the Kenya
National Archives are complete.
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concept of “grave and sudden provocation” vis-à-vis defenses claiming the
witchcraft of the deceased and traces the “conversations” about these issues
within the opinions. These “conversations” in turn contributed to the imperial
network of knowledge about witchcraft, custom, British justice, and native
mentality. Overall, the digest cases ultimately turn on the same question:
When, if ever, is the witchcraft of the deceased sufficient to commute a
capital sentence?
The witchcraft-related murder cases recorded in the East Africa Court
of Appeal digests between 1939 and 1941 were appeals from death senten-
ces for murders in which the appellants claimed that they had killed the
deceased after coming to believe that the deceased had somehow practiced
witchcraft against them or members of their families. The appeals were
made on the grounds that the witchcraft of the deceased had constituted
“grave and sudden provocation”, a legally mitigating condition capable of
reducing sentences of murder to ones of manslaughter or even lesser char-
ges. In the 1939 case, Rex versus Kimutai arap Mursoi, the appellant arg-
ued that he had killed the deceased because he believed the deceased was
a wizard and had laid a spell on the appellant’s child33. In the 1940 case,
Rex versus Mawalawa bin Nyangweza, the appellant admitted he had killed
the deceased because “witch doctors” had told the appellant that the decea-
sed had bewitched the appellant’s brother and the appellant then decided
to kill the deceased for bewitching his whole family34. Similarly, in the
1941 case, Rex versus Sitakimatata s/o Kimwage, the appellant argued that
he had been told by the deceased that the latter had killed the appellant’s
wife by witchcraft and would do the same to the appellant. The appellant
then decided to kill the deceased and did so a few hours later35. The appel-
lants in the 1941 case, Fabiano Kinene s/o Mukye, Seperiano Kiwanuka s/o
Kintu, Albert Iseja s/o Kintu, argued the witchcraft of the deceased had
driven them to kill him by inserting 20 green bananas into his anus after
coming on the deceased crawling naked around their compound36.
In deciding these cases, the courts debated the constitutive elements
of “grave and sudden provocation”, and turned to the precedent established
by the decision in Rex versus Kumwaka. The following paragraph from
Kumwaka emerged as a veritable “go-to passage” in adjudicating witchcraft-
murder appeals. The passage reads as follows:
“The plea has frequently been put forward in murder cases that the deceased had
bewitched or threatened to bewitch the accused, and that plea has been consistently
rejected except in cases where the accused has been put in such fear of immediate
danger to his own life that the defense of grave and sudden provocation has been
held proved”37.
33. 6 EACA, 1939.
34. 7 EACA, 1940.
35. 8 EACA, 1941.
36. Ibid.
37. 14 LRK, 1932.
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In the first case, Kimutai arap Mursoi, the appeals court dismissed the
appeal on the grounds of the Kumwaka passage cited above, and subsequent
decisions existed in dialogue with each other. For example, in Rex versus
Mawalawa bin Nyangweza, the justices dismissed the appeal, citing both
precedents established by Kumwaka and Kimutai arap Mursoi, while the
appeal in Rex versus Sitakimatata s/o Kimwage was also dismissed, again
citing Kumwaka and Kimutai arap Mursoi. In contrast, the murder convic-
tions were reduced to manslaughter in Fabiano Kinene s/o Mukye and
Others, the courts relying on Kumwaka, Kimutai arap Mursoi, and Mawal-
awa bin Nyangweza, to reach the decision that “grave and sudden provoca-
tion” had been held proved.
But while straightforward in their rejection or acceptance of the appeals,
the decisions in these cases also complicated “grave and sudden provoca-
tion”, parsing it and reading it in conversation with other legal conditions
present in the cases such as “malice aforethought” and a “real but mistaken
belief” in witchcraft. In Mawalawa, for instance, the courts were concerned
with assessing the veracity and reasonableness of the appellant’s claims
about the witchcraft of the deceased, but nonetheless ruled that “There is
some evidence tending to support his [the appellant’s] story but even assum-
ing it to be true the decided cases in East Africa establish that it does not
amount to such legal provocation as would justify us in reducing the offence
to manslaughter”38. Next, in formulating the opinion in Sitakimatata s/o
Kimwege, the justice criticized the “go-to passage” from Kumwaka, attend-
ing to the subjectivity of the affective element of “fear” and raising the
question of “native mentality”. The opinion explained,
“The phraseology used in this passage seems to me, with respect, not to be entirely
free from obscurity. It is rather difficult to discover from the concluding phrase
what standard of fear is required to establish a defense of provocation based on a
belief in witchcraft, and the emotion of fear (which does not seem to me to have
any place in the English doctrine of provocation) is confused with the emotion of
anger, which is, I think, the natural and only product or result of provocation
received”39.
The justice’s ultimate conclusion was that while the element of “fear”
was ambiguous, the circumstances of the case did not achieve the standard
of “suddenness” demanded by the Penal Code to prove “grave and sudden
provocation”.
The decision in the case of Fabiano Kinene s/o Kinene and Others entai-
led the most complex analysis by the courts and came to be cited in almost
all subsequent witchcraft-related murder cases. While addressing “grave
and sudden provocation”, the decision also focused on questions of “malice
38. 7 EACA, 1940.
39. 8 EACA, 1941.
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aforethought”, on the veracity and reasonableness of the appellants’ witch-
craft beliefs, and on “native mentality” more generally. First, the appeals
court concurred with the original High Court of Uganda judgment that the
statements of Fabiano and his cohort demonstrated that they had killed the
deceased with “malice aforethought”. Second, the court drew on the opi-
nions of assessors and on general attitudes about “native mentality” and
witchcraft in deciding that Fabiano and the other appellants did hold a “real
but mistaken belief” in the witchcraft of the deceased. The decision
explained,
“With their strong suspicions of his past history they would need very little to
convince them and the sensitiveness of the African mind in this respect is shown
by the evidence of the Muruka chief Fenekansi that ‘if in the night I saw a man
naked crawling in my compound I would think he was a witch doctor actually
practising witchcraft’”40.
Yet drawing on the opinions in Kumwaka, Kimutai arap Mursoi, and
Mawalawa bin Nyangweza, the courts concluded that the appellants’ belief
in witchcraft while introducing the possibility of a defense of “grave and
sudden provocation”, did not alone constitute sufficient grounds to prove
“grave and sudden provocation”. Like the decision in Sitakimatata s/o
Kimwege, the Fabiano decision critiqued the notion of “fear” and added
that witchcraft could also be regarded as inducement to the sort of anger
which in turn constituted an element of the “heat of passion” phrasing in
the Uganda Penal Code section dealing with “provocation”. The justice
explained the principle generally and in regard to the circumstances of
Fabiano. He wrote,
“In our opinion the principle in those cases [Kumwaka, etc.] is stated somewhat
too narrowly and perhaps not altogether accurately, in that the words ‘in the heat
of passion’ used in s. 198 of the Penal Code (Uganda) are more properly referable
to the emotion of anger than to that of fear. We think that if the facts proved
establish that the victim was performing in the actual presence of the accused some
act which the accused did genuinely believe, and which an ordinary person of the
community to which the accused belongs would genuinely believe, to be an act of
witchcraft against him or another person under his immediate care (which would
be a criminal offence under the Criminal Law (witchcraft) Ordinance of Uganda
and similar legislation in other East African territories), he might be angered to
such an extent as to be deprived of the power of self-control and induced to assault
the person doing the act of witchcraft. And if this be the case a defense of grave
and sudden provocation is open to him. It must always be a question of fact as
to whether he is in all the circumstances of the particular case acting in the great
of passion caused by grave and sudden provocation and of course on such an issue
he must be given the benefit of any reasonable doubt. We think it not unreasonable
to say that in the present case the accused persons, when they seized the deceased
in the compound and proceeded to kill him, may have been so acting”41.
40. 8 EAC, 1941.
41. Ibid.
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The above passage thus weaves together two important ideas. First,
the opinion argues that more than one affective state, “anger” as well as
“fear”, is sufficient to induce the immediate and overwhelming passion
which is an ineluctable constituent element of “provocation”. Second, the
opinion attends to “native mentality” vis-à-vis the question of witchcraft,
identifying a standard of reasonableness which takes in local mindsets and
mores, but also designates witchcraft as it is extrapolated in colonial law.
The opinion then went on to reference directly Sitakimatata s/o Kimwago,
reiterating the decision in that case that both “gravity” and “suddenness”
needed to be held proved in order for a defense or an appeal on the grounds
of “grave and sudden provocation” in a witch-murder case to be successful.
Ultimately, the appeal court reduced the murder conviction to one of
manslaughter. The justice explained how the elements of “grave and sud-
den provocation” were present in the case. The “highly suspicious actions
of the deceased”, crawling naked around the compound at night, could be
reasonably considered fear and/or anger-inducing behavior according to
local standards, and also an offense according to colonial anti-witchcraft
legislation. Thus, the behavior of the deceased constituted an “immediate
provocative act” in the eyes of the courts. Also, the appeals court’s decision
emphasized the issue of the time between the “provocative act” and the
killing of the deceased, noting how Fabiano and his cohort had almost
instantly attacked the deceased upon finding him crawling naked in their
space. From the court’s perspective then, the killing had been an immediate
response to “grave and sudden provocation”. Nonetheless, the decision
concluded by reiterating that despite the decision in Fabiano, the justices
“in no way mean[t] to suggest that we believe witchcraft per se will consti-
tute a circumstance of excuse of mitigation for killing a person believed to
be a witch or wizard when there is no immediate provocative act”42.
The decision in Fabiano became a key referent in witchcraft-related
murder cases from the early 1940s onward in much the same way that
the decision in Kumwaka was central in the previous decade. Subsequent
decisions in both the colony’s High Courts and the East Africa Court of
Appeal also asserted the precedent enshrined in Fabiano that a proven belief
in the witchcraft of the deceased alone could not reduce a conviction of
murder. Referencing each other as well as Fabiano and other earlier cases,
a number of these decisions also aimed to refine the element of “reasonable-
ness” in regard to appellants’ beliefs in the witchcraft of the deceased. In
the 1942 case, Rex versus Nzau wa Mukwata, the defendant argued that he
had killed the deceased, his mother-in-law and a reputed witch, because he
believed she had bewitched his children to death, and when confronted, the
deceased threatened the defendant with death by witchcraft43. In a second
1942 case, Rex versus Kelementi Maganga s/o of Ochieng, Zadoki Omoiti
42. Ibid.
43. 20 LRK Part II, 1942.
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s/o Okechi, the two appellants beat the deceased, reputed to be a wizard,
and the second appellant also speared him, claiming to the deceased’s son
in the course of the beating that he had caught the deceased practicing
witchcraft by walking naked around the second appellant’s home. In the
1945 case, Rex versus Kajuna s/o of Mbake, the appellant claimed that he
had killed the deceased, his father, because the appellant believed his father
to have been killing the appellant’s child by supernatural means44. In the
1949 case, Rex versus Petero Wabwire s/o Malemo, the appellant claimed
that he had killed his wife because he believed she was practicing witchcraft
against him as a result of her having “medicine” in her possession and
refusing to tell the appellant where she had acquired it45. Finally, in the
1951 case, Eria Galikuwa versus Rex, the appellant claimed that he had
been threatened with death by the deceased, a witchdoctor, unless he paid
the deceased 1,000 sh., and being unable to pay instead killed the deceased46.
Referencing Fabiano, the decisions in each of these cases focus on stan-
dards of “reasonableness” pertaining to the appellants’ perceptions of the
behaviors of the deceased as being “provocative” acts of witchcraft. The
decision in Nzau wa Mukwata held that the circumstances of the case put
in evidence by the appellant before the local magistrate seemed to show that
the deceased had committed an act of witchcraft according to anti-witchcraft
legislation when she threatened the appellant with death-by-witchcraft and
that her speech constituted a “provocative” act from the perspective of a
“reasonable” person of their community. Reiterating the precedent that a
“mere belief in witchcraft will not mitigate a killing” without another factor
attaching and the Colonial Office’s opinion on the primacy of “local” cir-
cumstances in dealing with witchcraft-related murder cases, the appeal court
commuted the death sentence. The appeal in Kelementi Maganga and
Zadoki Omoiti claimed a similarity in facts with Fabiano, and the appeal
court’s decision held that both the appellants’ testimony on the deceased’s
behavior—“walking naked around another’s property” and the testimony of
the deceased’s sons that he “was commonly regarded as a wizard and than
as such his company was shunned by neighbors” was sufficient to reduce
the murder conviction to one of manslaughter.
According to the decisions in the two cases discussed above, the appeal
court justices had been willing to give the appellants the benefit of the doubt
in assessing the “reasonableness” of their claims about the “provocative”
witchcraft of the deceased. In the cases of Kajuna s/o Mbake and Petero
Wabwire s/o Malemo, the appeals court rejected the appeals on the grounds
that “grave and sudden provocation” was not proved and that the appellants’
witchcraft beliefs were not reasonable. In Petero Wabwire, the court found
the appellant’s belief that the deceased was practicing witchcraft against him
44. 12 EACA, 1945.
45. 16 EACA, 1949.
46. 18 EACA, 1951.
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because she possessed substances or “medicine” whose origin she refused to
disclose was not reasonable according to local standards. Similarly, in
Kajuna, the justices found that the appellant’s belief that the deceased was
killing the appellant’s family by “supernatural means” was “unreasonable”
because the appellant could not cite an immediate, “provocative” act which
inspired this belief. The decision explained,
“A mere belief founded on something metaphysical as opposed to something physi-
cal, that a person is causing the death of another by supernatural means however
honest that belief may be has not so far as we are aware been regarded by this
Court as a mitigating circumstance in law [. . .]”47.
Finally, the decision in Eria Galikuwa refined and reemphasized many
of the principles laid out in the cases above. Criticizing the imprecision in
the decisions in Kimutai, Mawalawa, Sitakimatata, and Fabiano, the justice
asserted that “anger” as well as “fear” was a necessary constituent of “provo-
cation”. The decision also underscored that the “provocative” act of witch-
craft needed to be “overt”, i.e., “physical”, “visible” or “audible” and had
to constitute witchcraft according to anti-witchcraft legislation. And draw-
ing on Petero Wabwire, the decision expanded the timeframe for “provoca-
tion”. It explained,
“The Penal Code does not say that the unlawful act or insult done to or in the
presence of another person must be one entailing immediate consequences of a
wrongful nature, and there might be upon occasion a wrongful act which was indica-
tive of a future intention on the part of the doer and which therefore might be of
such a nature as to come within the legal definition of provocation”48.
The appeal court found that the conditions for “provocation” were not
satisfied because the appellant had shown himself to be motivated by “fear
alone” and that he acted in “despair” rather than in the “heat of passion”.
Further, the decision added that the appellant’s actions were the result of
deliberated intention rather than of being “suddenly deprived of his self-
control”. And finally, drawing on the opinion of the assessors, the appeal
court found that the appellant had not availed himself of the legal options
available for dealing with the threats of the deceased and instead “chose
deliberately to take the law into his own hands”49.
In each of these cases, the courts were restrained by the law from con-
sidering witchcraft as a defense without attaching it to another legal category
of defense, most often “grave and sudden provocation”. But an attention
to witchcraft enabled the courts to distinguish killings in retribution for
witchcraft from killings for more mundane reasons. Overall, these cases
47. 12 EACA, 1945.
48. 18 EACA, 1951.
49. Ibid.
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both followed and reinforced the precedent of recommendation to the Gov-
ernor’s clemency, a practice which often resulted in the reduction or squash-
ing of capital sentences.
Colonial and Post-colonial Continuities
A central aim of this article has been to trace how the colonial state
attempted to grapple with the problem of witchcraft-related violence through
the refinement of law and important legal concepts within the institution
of courts. Yet at the same moment these cases illustrate the state’s attempt
to assert its hegemony over the exercise of violence, they also reflect how
the archival remains of non-state actors point to gaps in colonial control
(Pandey 2000). An historical analysis of such cases has contemporary rel-
evance and resonances because documentary and ethnographic evidence
suggests crimes related to witchcraft are not simply a colonial, but also a
current problem as well50. Rather than declining during the second half of
the twentieth century, sources suggest that “witchcraft”-related violence and
disorder has likely increased while the law’s efficacy in dealing with such
problems has not.
For one, the state’s historic approach to witchcraft in regard to “witch-
craft” described above remains legally enshrined51. The Witchcraft Ordi-
nance of 1925 and the Witchcraft Ordinance (revised) of 1981, the law
contra “witchcraft” currently on the books, are in language and substance
practically identical. And, both the colonial and post-colonial ordinances
entail a “poetics of incredulity” which seeks to deny the reality of “witch-
craft” while at the same moment disciplining “witchcraft” practices and
beliefs52. Like the colonial-era ordinance, post-colonial anti-witchcraft
legislation indirectly stimulates violence against “witches” as the alleged
victims of witchcraft find themselves unable to pursue justice in the post-
colonial courts.
While legal approaches to witchcraft have remained consistent, the type
and frequency of violence related to “witchcraft” practices and beliefs have
not changed significantly either. The following cases—one recounted in the
legal language of the courts and the other in pithy journalistic prose—typify
“witchcraft”-related violence in Kenya, and indeed, across Africa generally.
50. For example, the archives of the Daily Nation, Kenya’s premier newspaper, hold
files containing nearly 30 years worth of clippings on witchcraft-related crimi-
nal matters.
51. The Kenya government’s approach to witchcraft and related crimes contrasts
markedly with those of other African governments as described by GESCHIERE
(2005), ASHFORTH (2005), and WEST (2005).
52. The Witchcraft Ordinance (No. 23 of 1925) and the Witchcraft Act (Chapter 67,
1981). Copies of the 1981 legislation are available through the Government
Printer in Nairobi.
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The first case summary reads,
“The accused, a member of the Mkamba tribe was charged with the murder of K.,
his mother-in-law, who was reputed to be a witch and whom the accused believed
had caused the deaths of several of his relatives by witchcraft. Accused met K.
and besought her to cease from practising witchcraft. K. answered, ‘You are always
accusing me of practising witchcraft, you also will die by witchcraft.’ Whereupon
the accused became infuriated and attacked and killed K.”53.
And the second summary states,
“A man and his wife were killed in cold blood on suspicion practicing witchcraft
[. . .]. Villagers forcibly removed them from their house, blindfolded them and tied
them to a tree before stoning them to death [. . .] a witness [. . .] told journalists
that the couple unsuccessfully pleaded for mercy, promising not to practice witch-
craft any more”. He said, “They had earlier confessed to having bewitched several
families in the area. They vowed not to repeat the act, but angry villagers could
hear none of it [. . .]” (Otieno 2003).
The first of these cases was heard by the Supreme Court of Kenya in
the early 1940s while the second was described in a 2003 edition of the
Daily Nation newspaper. But despite being separated by 60 years, the cir-
cumstances of the cases are remarkably similar. In each instance, spectacu-
lar and public violence against “witches” was produced by suspicions and
admissions of “witchcraft”, the latter made in defiance or in desperation.
These cases also point to the consistency with which individual or “commu-
nal” violence against “witches” has been practiced in Kenya. But at the
same moment, cases such as these also highlight the absence of the state
from disputes over “witchcraft”. In general, the institutions and agents of
the state have become involved actively and consistently involved in “witch-
craft” cases after “witchcraft”-related violence has created challenges to
state’s ability to maintain law and order.
*
The cases analyzed above demonstrate how witch murders offered signifi-
cant spaces in which the legal meanings of witchcraft were refined. In the
course of these cases, the courts parsed the somewhat ambiguous language
of anti-witchcraft legislation in efforts to determine whether the term “wit-
chcraft” officially denoted substances, acts, speech, or a combination of all
three. The cases also brought to the fore the question of the extent to
which intent was a necessary constituent of witchcraft.
53. Rex versus Mukwata, Criminal Case No. 200 of 1942. Law Reports of Kenya,
vol. XX, Part II, 1943, pp. 41-42.
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The opinions detailed above also point to some of the ways in which
murder cases contributed to the elaboration of key legal concepts. For
example, opinions handed down in such cases highlighted the importance
of proving “immediacy” of a threat when raising a defense of “grave and
sudden provocation”. Legal opinions in witch-murder cases also attended
to the importance reading and applying concepts like “malice aforethought”
and “real but mistaken belief” in tandem. Cases of witch murder show
that crimes related to witchcraft regularly entered colonial records and
became objects of official analyses through avenues other than simple con-
traventions of the Witchcraft Ordinances (Amin 1995).
In sum, an historical analysis of witch murders in the courts and on the
books points to some of the ways in which witchcraft has constituted an
important space in which larger questions of power have been contested
from the colonial era to the present day. Such an analysis demonstrates
that “witchcraft” has existed not as an anthropological curiosity, but as a
readily recognized and legally intractable source of violent disorder in Kenya.
Department of History, Northeastern University, Boston.
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ABSTRACT
This article traces the legal genealogies of witchcraft claims and counter-claims within
the legal arena of colonial Kenya. Based on cases contained in the files of Kenya’s
Ministry of Legal Affairs and in the digests of the Supreme Court of Kenya and of
the High Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa, this article argues that the witchcraft
claims and counter-claims made in East Africa’s highest courts contributed to the
refinement of the legal meanings of witchcraft and to the elaboration of legal concepts
central to the prosecution of capital crimes. This article treats murder cases in which
witchcraft is posed not as the means but instead as the motive for the murder at
hand as a central space in which notions of “customs” and “crimes” collide. In
such cases, the alleged “witch” is not on trial for witchcraft or for another crime
committed through witchcraft per se, but is instead the decedent in the murder being
tried. The defendant, in turn, is on trial not for a murder committed through witch-
craft but rather for a murder motivated by the witchcraft turned against him or her
by the decedent. And, in such witchcraft operates variously as a claims-making
strategy of the defense and as a means for the courts to consider further standards
of “reasonableness” in local contexts. Yet at the same time, defense claims and the
courts’ counter-claims about the witchcraft of the decedent each operate on a broader
epistemological level, calling into question not only essential categories like “victim”
and even “murder”, but also key legal concepts such as “provocation” and “mal-
ice aforethought”.
RÉSUMÉ
Motif plutôt que moyen : généalogies juridiques d’affaires de meurtres de sorciers au
Kenya. — Cet article retrace la généalogie des demandes en justice et des demandes
reconventionnelles liées à la sorcellerie au Kenya à l’époque coloniale. En s’appuyant
sur les minutes des procès conservés dans les Archives du ministère kenyan des
Affaires juridiques ainsi que sur les comptes rendus de la Cour Suprême du Kenya
et de la Haute Cour d’Appel pour l’Afrique orientale, cet article montre que les
demandes en justice et les demandes reconventionnelles ont contribué à une défini-
tion juridique plus précise de la « sorcellerie » et à l’élaboration de concepts essen-
tiels au jugement des crimes capitaux. Cet article traite d’affaires de meurtre dans
lesquelles la sorcellerie n’est pas présentée comme le moyen mais comme le motif
du meurtre jugé et comme un espace central où se heurtent les notions de « cou-
tumes » et de « crime ». Dans ces procès, le sorcier supposé ne passe pas en jugement
pour sorcellerie ni pour un crime commis par le truchement de la sorcellerie, mais
il est la victime du meurtre jugé. De même, le défendeur n’est pas jugé pour un
meurtre commis par le biais de la sorcellerie mais pour un meurtre motivé par la
sorcellerie, utilisée à ses dépens par la personne décédée. Ainsi, la sorcellerie peut
être utilisée soit comme une stratégie de défense soit comme un moyen pour les
juges de considérer de nouvelles normes de « raisonnabilité » dans certains contextes
locaux. Les accusations et contre-accusations remettent ainsi en question non seule-
ment des notions essentielles comme celles de « victime » et de « meurtre » mais
aussi des concepts juridiques clés tels que la « provocation » et la « préméditation ».
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